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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("URAP") Rule 24(a)(4), this
Court has jurisdiction in accordance with Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78A-3102(3)G) and (4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(b)( 1), Appellee is dissatisfied with Appellant's
Statement of Issues. URAP Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B) require Appellant to provide a
citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. In the
present case, Appellant's brief fails to satisfy such requirement. Furthermore, the issues
presented in Appellant's brief do not accurately reflect those subsequently argued therein.
Accordingly, the following issues are argued in Appellant's brief:
ISSUE #1. Whether the trial court erred by neglecting to analyze the contract as
an installment agreement. See Appellant's brief Pg. 9. This issue was not preserved for
appeal.
ISSUE #2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that an oral modification to
a written agreement is subject to the four-year statute of limitations. See Appellant's brief
Pg. 11. "[T]he application of a statute of limitation is a legal determination which we
review for correctness, however, to the extent that the statute of limitations analysis
involves subsidiary factual determinations, we review those factual determinations using
a clearly erroneous standard." Griffin v. Cutler, 339 P.3d 100, 103 if 14 (Utah App. 2014)
(internal citation omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear weight
Page
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of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City ofSt. George, 898 P .2d
1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) (internal citations omitted).
ISSUE #3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees. This issue was
not preserved for appeal.

. STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(6), the following statutes and rules are of central
importance to the appeal:

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure("URCP") Rule 61. Harmless Error. No error in either
the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is grounds for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("URAP") Rule 33. Damages for delay or
frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for Delay of Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal
case, if the court determines that a motion made of appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief,
or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion.
A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion
for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of
a party's response to a motion or other paper.
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(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to
the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages
should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which
form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless
otheiwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of
the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall
grant a hearing.

Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78B-2-113. Effect of payment, acknowledgement,
or promise to pay.
(1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute of
limitations form the date:
(a) the debt arose;
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the
debtor; or
(c) a payment is made on the debt by the debtor.
(2) If a right or action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable
either as a cause of action or ground for defense.
UCA § 78B-2-307 Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received:
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing;
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise;
(c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials
furnished;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following section of Title 25,
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action
one year, under Section 25-6-1 O;
(b) Subsection 25-6-(5)(1 )(b); or
(c) Subsection 26-6-6(1); and
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
UCA § 78B-2-309. Within six years - Mesne profits or real property - Instrument in
writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability found upon an instrument in writing, except
those mentioned in section 78B-2-311; and
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused wildland fire.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(7), the nature of the case regards the statute of
limitations on an oral agreement. The course of proceedings and disposition of the court
below is as follows:
1.

On May 15, 2014, Goldenwest Credit Union (the "Appellant"), filed a Complaint.

R.1-6.

2.

On June 16, 2014, Kathleen Kenworthy (the "Appellee"), filed an Answer and

Counterclaim. R.20-24.
3.

On August 8, 2014, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting Memorandum. R.63-70.
4.

On August 22, 2014, Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition. R. 73-94.

5.

On August 29, 2014, Appellee filed a Reply Memorandum. R.97-119.

6.

On November 7, 2014, Appellant and Appellee attended oral argument on the

Motion for Summary Judgment. R.282-292
7.

On December 22, 2014, the trial court entered a ruling granting the Motion for

Summary Judgment. R.167-17 4.

8.

On February 24, 2015, Appellee filed an Affidavit and Request for Attorney Fees.

R.175-200.

9.

On April 14, 2014, the trial court entered an Order to Pay Attorney Fees. R.210-

211.
10.

On May 11, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. R.214-215.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(7), a statement of the facts relevant to the issues

presented for review are as follows:
1.

On April 24, 2006, Appellant and Appellee entered into a written loan agreement

for the purchase a 2006 Nissan Frontier ("property") secured by the property. R.4-6.
2.

The written agreement contains a provision which states "when you are in default,

the credit union can, without advance notice to you, require immediate payment of what
you owe on the loan and take possession of the property." R.6.
3.

On May 9, 2008, Appellant claimed insurance proceeds on the property in the

amount of $17,549.60 and applied such amount to the outstanding balance under the
written agreement. R.41 and Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5.
4.

On May 9, 2008, Appellant and Appellee orally agreed to the payment of $200.00.

R.168 and Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5.
5.

On May 9, 2008, Appellee paid Appellant $200. R.168.

6.

On May 9, 2008, Appellee told Appellant "best for now may be able to do more

later". Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5.

7.

After May 9, 2008, Appellee made no payments to Appellant. R.168.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant has failed to demonstrate trial court error. The issues raised by

Appellant are either not preserved on appeal, harmless error, or supported only by
Appellants own assertions to which neither the facts of this case nor Utah law support.
Appellant's claim is based on an oral agreement subject to the four-year statute of
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limitations which expired prior to May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim.
Therefore, Appellant's claim is barred and the trial court did not err in so ruling.

ARGUMENT

ISSUE #1. The Appellant's argument that the trial court neglected to properly
analyze the loan liner contract ("contract") as an installment contract.
1. Appellant's Argument fails as it was not preserved for appeal.
The preservation rule is an essential part to our adversary system ... This
requires counsel to make a timely and specific objection on the record with
evidence and legal authority to support it. .. If a party wishes to challenge on
appeal the adequacy of the trial court's findings, trial counsel must first
raise the objection in the trial court with sufficient clarity to alert the trial
court to the alleged inadequacy ... The responsibility for detecting error is on
the party asserting it, not on the court .. .It generally would be unfair to
reverse a district court for a reason presented first on appeal ... Merely
mentioning an issue does not preserve it ... Objection at trial based on one
ground ... does not preserve for appeal any alternative ground for objection.

Utah Appellate Law Update Vol. 26 No. 6 Pg. 20 (internal citation omitted). In the
present case, Appellant failed to argue in the trial court that the contract should be
analyzed as an installment contract. While Appellant did argue that the statute of
limitation did not begin to run on the contract until June 15, 2008, it did so under the
premise that the entire contract was breached on that date and not just an installment.
R.7516. Therefore, such argument was not preserved for this appeal.

Furthermore, Appellant failed to comply with URAP Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (BJ.
Such requires Appellant "to provide a citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court." URAP Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B). In the present case,
Page
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Appellant's brief does not contain the required citation or alternative statement of
grounds. Therefore, such argument was not preserved on appeal.

2. In the alternative, should this Court decide that such argument was preserved for
appeal, such argument is harmless error as Appellant exercised its option to accelerate
the alleged installments. URCP Rule 61 states "The court at every stage of the

proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." URCP Rule 61. In the present case, the Appellant
exercised its option to accelerate the alleged installments under the contract on May 9,
2008 causing the debt to arise, or in Appellant's words "performance due", on each
installment before May 12, 2008 as found by the trial court. "[A]ll the acceleration clause
does is accelerate the due date of future installments to the date of the exercise of the
right of acceleration." See Appellant's Brief Pg. 7 (citing Farmers Merchants Bank v.
Templeton, 646 S.W.2d 920,923 (Tenn. App.1982)).

"[T]here must be some exercise of the option, some affirmative act showing
an intent to elect to accelerate; and that the additional clause 'without
demand of notice' means, simply, that the holder may exercise such option
without giving to the maker any notice of such intention and without
demand for payment of the unpaid balance which would thus be
accelerated ... such as by bringing suit thereon, or say, by entering the entire
unpaid balance as immediately due and payable upon [the] books of
account."
Carmichael v. Rice, 49 N.M. 114, 117 (N.M. 1945) (cited by KIXX Inc. v. Stallion
Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980). In the present case, the contract has an

acceleration clause which states "when you are in default, the credit union can, without
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advance notice to you, require immediate payment of what you owe on the loan and take
possession of the property." R.6 (emphasis added). On May 9, 2008, Appellant claimed

insurance proceeds on the property in the amount of $17,549.60 and applied such amount
to the outstanding balance. R.41 and Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5. Such
affirmative act, despite no notice to Appellee as none was required, constitutes
Appellant's exercise of its option to accelerate any future installments, causing the debt to
arise on each alleged installment before May 12, 2008 as found by the trial court.
Therefore, the trial court's alleged neglect to analyze the contract as an installment
contract is harmless as the statute of limitations on each alleged installment still expired
prior to May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim.

3. Also in the alternative, should this Court decide that such argument was preserved for
appeal and that Appellant did not exercise its option to accelerate the alleged
installments, such argument is harmless error as the statute of limitations on each
alleged installment still expired prior to May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim.

URCP Rule 61 states "The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." URCP 61. In the present case, the debt arose on each alleged installment of the
oral agreement on or before April 15, 2010 causing the four-year statute oflimitations on
each alleged installment to expire no later than April 15, 2014 almost a month prior to
May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim. "The cause of action accrues on each
installment when it becomes due and the installment begins to run from that moment on
Page
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that installment." See Appellant's brief Pg. 7 (citing Templeton). In the present case,
Appellants allege that Appellee owes a principle amount of$4,614.02.R.218. On May
9, 2008, the parties orally agreed to Appellee's repayment of debt in the amount of $200
~

per month. R.168 1 2. The adjusted repayment term can be ascertained through
calculation. See Appellant's brief Pg. 15. Such term would require 23 months of $200
payments to pay the principle amount ($4,414.02/$200 = 23 months), causing the debt to
arise on each alleged installment by April 15, 2010 (23 months after June 15, 2008).
Therefore, the trial Court's alleged neglect to analyze the Contract as an installment
contract is harmless as the four-year statute of limitations on each alleged installment still
expired prior May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim.
ISSUE #2. Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in concluding that an oral
modification to a written agreement is subject to four-year statute of limitations.
1. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant had the burden ofestablishing that whether
the oral agreement is a modification or a separate agreement is a genuine issue of
material fact.

The moving party has the burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment as a matter of
law is proper. However, once the moving party challenges an element of
the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material
fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present
evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Appellant's brief Pg. 12 (citing Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 117 (Utah 2008)).
Material fact is defined as crucial to the determination of the issue at hand. See Black's
Law Dictionary definition of Material Fact. In the present case, Appellee argued at trial
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that whether the oral agreement is a modification or a separate agreement is not a genuine
issue of material fact as both are oral obligations and subject to the four-year statute of
limitations. R.285. Such challenge shifted the burden to the Appellant to establish
sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. However, Appellant failed to meet
this burden. Although Appellant argued that whether the oral agreement is a modification
or a separate agreement is a question of fact, Appellant does not argue or supply evidence
that is sufficient to establish that such fact is crucial to the determination of whether to
apply the six or four-year statute of limitations. R.287. Therefore, Appellant failed to
meet its burden and should not now be allowed to fault the trail court.
Furthermore, the trial court supported Appellee 's argument that whether the oral
agreement is a modification or a separate agreement is not a genuine issue ofmaterial
fact. "[W]hether [the oral agreement] was a wholly new oral agreement ... or a

modification to the Original Agreement ... the result is the same." R.171. In support of its
conclusion, the Court cited the Strand case stating "where a specific material term of the
contract in writing is subsequently changed orally, the statute of limitations for oral
contracts applies." Strand v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 312 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1957).
Although Appellant now attempts to distinguish the Strand case from the present one,
such effort is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact. Therefore, Appellant fails to
meet its burden and should not now be allowed to fault the trial court.

2. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant incorrectly asserts that conditions precedent
to enforcement ofan oral modification also distinguish such from a separate agreement.
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In its brief, Appellant asserts that part performance, meeting of the minds, statue of
frauds, and a narrow change in terms distinguish the oral agreement as a modification.
See Appellant's brief Pg. 12 & 13. However, such elements do not distinguish the oral
agreement as a modification as such elements are also elements to establish a separate
oral agreement. See Goggin v. Goggin, 267 P.3d 885, 893 ,I 37 (Utah 2011) (stating "it is
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is
essential to the formation of a contract") and Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah
1983) (stating "that part performance allows a court of equity to enforce an oral
agreement, if it has been partially performed notwithstanding the statute [offrauds}").
The only element set forth by Appellant that is not also an element to establish a separate
oral agreement is a narrow change in terms. In support of this element, Appellant cites
the Fisher case, in which a change in the due date of annual payments was held to be a
narrow modification, and argues that such is analogous to the change of the amount due
in the present case. However, the Court in the Fisher case expressly disagrees with such
analogy stating "the modification as limited to the timing of payments only. It did not
change the amount due." Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah App. 1995).
Therefore, the elements set forth by Appellant do not distinguish the oral agreement as a
modification.

3. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant ineptly attempts to distinguish the Strand case.

In its brief, Appellant asserts that the Strand case is inapplicable because the terms of the
modification can be proven without resort to parol evidence and the oral agreement is
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within the statute of frauds. See Appellant's brief Pg. 14. However, the court in the
Strand case does not rely, or even mention, either of these factors in affirming "the wellestablished rule that actions on contracts which are partly in writing and partly oral are
subject to the statute of limitations covering oral contracts" Strand at 563. Converse to
Appellant's assertion, the Strand case is very analogous to the present case. In the Strand
case, an oral agreement was entered between the parties for the purpose of adjusting the
manner and time of performance (i.e. insurance, expenses, costs, completion date, capital
expenditures). In the present case, an oral agreement was entered between the parties also
for the purpose of adjusting the manner and time of performance (i.e. payment amount,
balance due, which adjusts completion date). R.168 1 2.
Moreover, the only fact distinguishing the Strand case from the present case is that
the written contract in the Strand case contained a clause providing for subsequent
adjustments by oral agreement. However, even with such a clause, the court in the Strand
case still ruled that "the contract becomes an oral one and any claim arising under such a
contract is governed by the [statute of limitations for oral contracts]" Strand at 564.
Therefore, the Strand case is applicable and, pursuant thereto, the entire contract, both
written and oral terms, are subject to the four-year statute of limitations.

4. Appellant's Argument fails as Appellant's first ipse duit assertion is not supported by
relevant law. In its brief, Appellant incorrectly asserts that:
[W]here an agreement is governed by the statue of frauds and the evidence
of the terms of the agreement are sufficient to meet the requirements of the
statute of frauds, the written nature of the agreement is established and the
Page
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oral nature of any evidence is not determinative of the treatment of the
contract.
See Appellant's brief Pg. 15. In support of its assertion, Appellant cites Texas W.

Ry. Co. v. Gentry, 8 S.W. 98 {Texas 1888). However, the Gentry case does not support
Appellant's assertion for the following reasons: (1) the Gentry case is limited to corporate
resolutions and not relevant to the present case; (2) the Gentry case is a Texas case and
not binding precedent in Utah; (3) the court in the Strand case did not cite the Gentry case
butLuglan v. Tomlin, 287 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1956) to support its

holding that "changing some of the terms rendered the contract part oral and part written, ·
and the four year statute of limitations applies" Strand at 563; (4) the Luglan case,
decided 68 years after the Gentry case, more adequately reflects the current position of
the Texas court. Therefore, as Appellant's assertion is not supported by relevant law,
such should not be adopted by this Court nor applied to the present case.

5. In the alternative, should this court decide to adopt Appellant's assertion, Appellant's
argument fails as the oral agreement does not satisfy the statue offrauds. "[the] standard

for sufficient part performance [is]: First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and
definite; Second, the acts done in performance of the contract must equally be clear and
definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance on the contract." Martin at 275. In the
present case, the terms of the oral agreement were not clear and definite. Although
Appellee paid $200.00 on May 9, 2008, it was not clear whether payments would remain
at $200.00. See Appellant's brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5 (stating "best for now may be able
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to do more later"). Also, it is not clear whether such payments were to be applied to the
entire balance on the note or remaining balance after offset of insurance proceeds. See
Appellant's brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5 (stating "payment of $17,549.60 made on 05/08/08
toward $487.21 payment). Also, as the payment amount and the balance due are not clear
and definite the payment schedule and application of interest are also not clear and
definite. Therefore, even if this Court adopts Appellant's assertion, such is not satisfied in
the present case.

6. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant' second ipse dixit assertion is not supported by
relevant law. In its brief, Appellant incorrectly asserts that the oral agreement is subject

to 6-year statute of limitations as the terms of the alleged modification does not require
parol evidence. See Appellant's brief Pg. 15-16. In support of its assertion, and contrary
to its previous argument that the Strand case is inapplicable, Appellant cites the Strand
case which states "it is true that a written promise to pay without naming the amount may
be construed as founded on a written instrument where an objective standard for
determining the price is provided in the instrument." Strand at 563 (emphasis added).

However, such statement is separate from the rule of law relied on by the court in Strand
and not relevant to the present case. In the Strand case, immediately following the
statement, the court uses the disjunctive conjunction "but" to separate the statement from
the following rule of law: "where a specific material term of the contract in writing is
subsequently changed orally, the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts
applies." Strand at 563. The Court then continues by explaining why the rule oflaw and
Page
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not the former statement is applicable. "[S]ince the written contract contained a precise
payment schedule, a definite date for completion, and no promise to pay for depreciation
or capital outlays, the later oral modification of these certain terms superseded and
replaced those written." Strand at 563. Similarly, in the present case, the written contract
contained a precise payment schedule and a definite date for completion. R.4. The later
oral agreement superseded and replaced the written terms, making the rule of law, and
not the former statement, applicable to the present case. Therefore, as Appellant's
assertion is not supported by relevant law, such should not be adopted by this Court nor
applied to the present case.
Furthermore, the statement cited in the Strand case has been applied only when an
objective standard for determining the price was provided in the written contract. See
Lyons v. Moise, 183 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.App. 1944) ("Moise expressly agreed to reimburse
Lyons for any advancements made him") and Rawleigh Co. v. Graham, 103 P.2d 1076
(Wash. 1940) ("the writing contained a promise to pay and furnishes an objective
standard for the ascertainment of any amount due thereunder"). In the present case, the
written contract does not contain an objective standard for determining the price. R.4-6.
The lack of such objective standard makes the statement inapplicable. Therefore, as
Appellant's assertion is not supported by relevant law, such should not be adopted by this
court nor applied to the present case.

7. In the alternative should this Court decide to apply Appellant assertion, Appellant's
argument fails as the terms of the oral agreement require parol evidence. Parol evidence
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is defined as "testimony provided by any witness in court." See Black's Law Dictionary
definition of ParoI Evidence. In the present case, the terms of the alleged modification
require testimony provided by a witness. Such testimony is required to establish: ( 1) the
amount of the payment; (2) the balance on the note; (3) and the payment schedule, and
(4) application of interest. See Appellant's brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5 (stating "best for
now may be able to do more later" and "payment of 17,549.60 made on 05/08/08 toward
$487 .21 payment). Therefore, even if this Court applies Appellant's assertion, such is not
satisfied in the present case.

ISSUE #3. Appellant's argument that the award of attorney fees be reversed.
1. Appellant's argument fails as it was not preserved on appeal.
The preservation rule is an essential part to our adversary system ... This
requires counsel to make a timely and specific objection on the record with
evidence and legal authority to support it ... If a party wishes to challenge on
appeal the adequacy of the trial court's findings, trial counsel must first
raise the objection in the trial court with sufficient clarity to alert the trial
court to the alleged inadequacy... the responsibility for detecting error is on
the party asserting it, not on the court ... it generally would be unfair to
reverse a district court for a reason presented first on appeal. .. merely
mentioning an issue does not preserve it ... objection at trial based on one
ground ... does not preserve for appeal any alternative ground for objection.
Utah Appellate Law Update Vol. 26 No. 6 Pg. 20. In the present case, Appellant
failed to object to Appellee's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees. See Appellant's
brief Pg. 4. Therefore, such argument was not preserved for this appeal.

2. Appellant's requests that the issue of expenses including attorney fees for this appeal
be evaluated by the trial court when the final order is entered fails. "When a party who
Page I 19
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attorney fees incurred on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 30 (Utah 1988). In the
present case, the Appellee received attorney fees in the trial court. R. 210 - 211.
Therefore, should Appellee prevail on this appeal, this Court should award Appellee its
attorney fees on appeal.

3. Appellee is entitled to attorney fees on appeal and damages. "Briefs which are not in
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the
court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer." URAP Rule 24(k). We
agree that Defendant's brief wholly fails to comply with Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and must be stricken. State v. Smith, 238 P.3d 1103 (Utah App.
2010). The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the
order indicated ... citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court." Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B). In the present case, Appellant's brief fails to satisfy
such requirement. Therefore, Appellant's brief should be stricken and this Court should
award Appellee its attorney fees on appeal.
Furthermore, this Court should award Appellee its attorney fees and damages.
URAP Rule 33 states:
... if the court determines that a ... appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include,
single or double costs, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party ... for purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal ... is one that is not
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grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
URAP Rule 33. Sanctions are appropriate for appeals obviously without merit,
without reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper
judgment." Redd v. Hill, 304 P.3d 861 (Utah 2013). A frivolous appeal is defined as one
in which no justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as

devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed. Hunt v. Hunt, 785
P.2d 414,416 (Utah 1990). In the present case, Appellant's brief raised three issues each
of which was either not preserved, harmless error, or supported only by Appellants own

ipse dixit assertions to which neither the facts of the case nor Utah law support.
Therefore, this Court should award Appellee its attorney fees and damages.
CONCLUSION
As set forth herein, Appellant has failed to demonstrate trial court error. Therefore,
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court ruling and award the
Appellee attorney fees on appeal and damages pursuant to URAP 33.
DATED this 8th day of February 2016,

Peter A. Klc and Associates, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby Certify that two (2) true and correct copies and one (1) searchable CD of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed by first class mail with postage fully
prepaid to the following:
Dana T. Farmer
SMITH KNOWLES P.C.
2225 Washington Blvd., Ste 200
Ogden UT 84401
Attorney for Appellant
DATED this 8th day of February 2016,
Peter A. K.lc and Associates, PLLC
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(l 1), no addendum is necessary as Appellee as
referred to the addendum of Appellant in accordance with URAP Rule 24(b)(2).

·@l
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 24(t)(l)(C), I hereby certify that Appellee's Brief complies with
the type-volume limitation. I have relied on the word count of the word processing
:.JP

system used to prepare the brief to determine that the brief contain 6224 words.
DATED this 8th day ofFebruary 2016,
Peter A. Kie and Associates, PLLC
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